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Abstract:  
This study examines CEOs and CFOs who have prior work experience as equity research analysts. 
Consistent with backgrounds in forecasting and valuation, we find these executives provide earnings 
guidance that is more accurate than that of other executives, and their M&A transactions generate 
significantly higher announcement returns. For available CEOs and CFOs, we examine their track 
records as research analysts with respect to forecasting accuracy and stock recommendation 
profitability. We find a positive association between a record of past forecasting accuracy and more 
accurate earnings guidance, as well as a positive association between past stock recommendation 
profitability and M&A announcement returns. Beyond these traits, we find these executives provide 
greater certainty in their answers to analysts during conference calls, especially when answering 
forward-looking questions. Finally, these executives’ firms exhibit superior accounting and stock 
return performance. Overall, our evidence suggests that early career skill sets can shape top executive 
performance outcomes.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The neo-classical view of top executive performance espouses a limited role for idiosyncratic 
traits. That is, executive performance is largely determined by contracting and monitoring mechanisms, 
as well as the firm and industry economic landscape (Bertrand and Schoar 2003). In contrast, upper-
echelons theory posits that organizational outcomes are, at least in part, determined by executives’ 
idiosyncratic characteristics (Hambrick and Mason 1984; Hambrick 2007). One strand of prior 
research utilizes a fixed-effect approach to show that Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) and Chief 
Financial Officers (CFOs) uniquely impact corporate practices and operations (e.g., Bertrand and 
Schoar 2003; Dyreng, Hanlon and Maydew 2010; Ge, Matsumoto and Zhang 2011). Peering into these 
effects, recent studies examine executive heterogeneity with respect to aspects such as education, 
personal characteristics, and career experience (Bamber, Jiang and Wang 2010; Custódio and Metzger 
2013; Benmelech and Frydman 2015; Law and Mills 2017). The thrust of these studies is to tie general 
experience or traits to operational outcomes and corporate policies. For example, a background in the 
military service leads to more conservative investment (Benmelech and Frydman 2015) or tax planning 
(Law and Mills 2017). 
In contrast, our interest is in specific experience. In particular, we investigate whether skill sets 
developed during formative years carryover and meaningfully impact top executive performance with 
respect to related tasks. We investigate this question by assembling a sample of CEO/CFOs who have 
prior work experience as equity research analysts.1 The equity research industry provides an excellent 
setting to address the importance of early career skill sets for several reasons. First, many career paths 
leading to top executive positions such as marketing, legal, and engineering are heterogeneous in 
nature. For example, a marketing executive might be involved in sales, advertising, media strategy, or 
                                                          
1 We examine CEOs and CFOs as a combined group representing companies’ top executives. For ease of exposition, we 
refer them as ‘CEO/CFOs’.  
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brand development; each one of these paths providing very different training and experiences. In 
comparison, forecasting earnings performance and valuing companies are standard features of the 
equity research analyst job. Second, forecasting and stock selection are not only standard, they are 
performed quite frequently and benefit from objective performance benchmarks in the form of 
earnings announcements and realized stock performance. Third, for the overwhelming majority of 
jobs leading to a top executive position, it would be impossible to quantify past performance due to 
both data availability and the inherent lack of easily measurable outputs. At least for part of our sample, 
we can accomplish this, and hence are able to compare former analyst CEO/CFOs’ past performance 
with their current performance on related tasks. Overall, the equity research setting permits us to 
investigate the transfer of skill sets from past job experience, in addition to providing insights into the 
specific transition from equity research to a top executive position.  
To identify former equity analysts, we begin with the BoardEx database from 1990 to 2017 
and retrieve CEO/CFOs with prior employment listed as an ‘analyst’. We narrow this to equity 
research analysts by manually checking for either buy-side or sell-side analyst experience with the 
following sources: LinkedIn, Bloomberg, Morningstar, Brokercheck, and The Wall Street Journal. Our 
final sample of equity analysts have, on average, six years of work experience as either a sell-side or 
buy-side research analyst.  
Consistent with career experience in earnings forecasting, we find former analysts provide 
earnings guidance that is more accurate than that of other executives, controlling for standard factors 
that explain cross-sectional differences in guidance accuracy. In terms of economic significance, the 
earnings forecasts provided by former analysts are 27.2% more accurate than those of other executives. 
This is an important finding since management earnings forecasts are heavily relied on by market 
participants, explaining greater return variance than such disclosures as earnings announcements, 
analysts’ forecasts, and SEC filings (Ball and Shivakumar 2008; Beyer, Cohen, Lys, and Walther 2010). 
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Equity analysts value and recommend stocks based on fundamentals, as well as an assessment 
of industry growth potential and the management team (Groysberg, Healy, Nohria and Serafeim 2012). 
We conjecture this experience should aid CEO/CFOs in valuing an acquisition and evaluating the 
target’s management which are critical steps in the acquisition process (Bruner and Perella 2004; 
DePamphilis 2019). To evaluate M&A performance, we obtain a sample of 7,981 U.S. acquisitions. 
Within this sample, former analyst CEO/CFO-led acquisitions represent a total of $110 billion in 
M&A deals, comprising about 2.5% of the total deal value. We find former analyst-led acquisitions 
are associated with abnormal return premiums to acquisition announcements between 1.1% and 1.2% 
larger than those of other executives. In economic terms, this translates to between $133 and $146 
million in additional shareholder value for the average former analyst-led acquirer.   
For a subset of these CEO/CFOs, we can trace their forecasting and stock picking 
performance histories. Similar to the level of experience we observe based on our original hand-
collection, these analysts average 6.8 years in the IBES database. We categorize their earnings research 
record as ‘better’ if their earnings forecast accuracy record is superior to that of the median analyst; 
we define their stock recommendation record in the same fashion. The results indicate a positive 
association between a record of better earnings forecasting and more accurate current earnings 
guidance, as well as a positive association between better stock recommendation profitability and 
current M&A success.  
In addition to forecasting earnings and recommending stocks, equity analysts are frequent 
participants in earnings conference calls. We posit this experience should help executives prepare for 
earnings calls and navigate the interaction with call participants. Conference calls are an important 
event to investigate since they represent a significant disclosure channel for management and provide 
market-relevant information beyond that of earnings announcements (Bowen, Davis and Matsumoto 
2002; Chen and Matsumoto 2006). Consistent with earnings call experience, we find former analyst 
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executives provide greater certainty in their answers to conference call questions. This beneficial effect 
is economically meaningful in that executives with analyst experience provide 13.3% more certain 
answers than do other executives. Moreover, this effect is especially pronounced when former analyst 
executives are asked forward-looking questions.   
Given the evidence of performance advantages in specific settings, a natural question to 
investigate is how former analysts’ firms perform overall. This is an empirical question since better 
performance on these tasks—guidance, M&A, and conference calls—certainly does not guarantee 
better overall firm performance. We examine annual measures of firm performance, including an 
accounting measure of performance (return on assets), and three- and four-factor adjusted stock 
return measures, finding evidence consistent with former analysts’ firms exhibiting superior 
performance. In terms of economic impact, top executives with analyst experience generate $64 
million higher net income, on average, and improve shareholder value between $122 and $150 million 
compared to other executives.  
There may be unobserved heterogeneity that explains why firms hire former analysts. For 
example, particular firms may prefer hiring an executive with a strong financial background. Hence, 
these firms might be more likely to hire a former analyst, but they also might be more likely to allocate 
resources to enhancing financial disclosures such as earnings guidance. Similar arguments could be 
made with respect to M&A success or conference call interactions. One approach to address this 
concern would be to include firm-fixed effects, alleviating the concern that unobserved time-invariant 
factors influence our estimates. Unfortunately, we have a low number of former analyst CEO/CFOs, 
and this approach would force our identification strategy to rest on the even smaller number of former 
analyst executives who switch firms. Hence, we cannot include firm-fixed effects and arrive at reliable 
estimates, this is a common identification problem in studies examining top executive characteristics 
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(e.g., Benmelech and Frydman 2015; Cain and McKeon 2016; Gupta, Briscoe and Hambrick 2017; 
Davidson, Dey and Smith 2019).   
Given these limitations, what empirical strategies can we implement to address endogeneity? 
Aside from including industry- and year-fixed effects, along with standard firm-level control variables, 
we augment our main tests with two additional analyses. In the first analysis, we label firm-years as 
‘pseudo’ former analyst executive firm-years for the years either before or after these executives take 
their roles, finding no significant impact on our dependent variables across analyses. Under the 
assumption that unmeasured firm characteristics are relatively stable—an assumption we share with 
the fixed-effects approach, this design can be viewed as an alternative strategy to address time-
invariant firm characteristics.   
Our second approach relies on examining alternative types of career experience. Our goal is 
to investigate whether the former analyst experience variable is perhaps capturing a related but 
different form of background such as general analyst skills, financial expertise, or quantitative 
experience. To proxy for general analyst expertise, we identify CEO/CFOs with prior work experience 
as financial analysts, but not as equity research analysts. A job in this category might involve budgeting, 
account reconciliation, analyzing control systems, among other tasks. The key distinction between this 
job and that of the equity research analyst is the lack of training and experience in our focal skill sets: 
earnings forecasting, stock valuation, and conference call interactions. To capture executives with 
general financial experience, we utilize executives with prior jobs in accounting or finance, and finally, 
for those with a quantitative experience, we identify those with engineering backgrounds. In contrast 
to the equity research analyst position, we do not find evidence these alternative job categories yield 
positive associations with guidance accuracy, M&A performance, or certainty in answering conference 
call questions. However, there is evidence CEO/CFOs with accounting or finance backgrounds are 
associated with better overall firm performance.      
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Our paper contributes to the broader literature in accounting and finance that examines the 
impact of top executives’ human capital on corporate performance outcomes (e.g., Bertrand and 
Schoar 2003; Malmendier and Tate 2009; Bamber et al. 2010; Dyreng et al. 2010; Law and Mills 2017). 
Different from these studies, our interest is in whether specific forms of experience appear to 
carryover to top executive performance for related corporate functions. This is important for at least 
two reasons. First, our findings may inform market participants in general and corporate boards in 
particular—especially, those in need of specific expertise—that in some settings, there appears to be 
a transference of unique skill sets from earlier careers to top executive positions. For instance, our 
finding that former analyst executives provide more accurate earnings guidance should be of interest 
to investors and analysts, who rely on this information to form their own performance forecasts and 
investment strategies. Furthermore, our finding that former analyst executives lead successful M&As 
should be of interest to stakeholders since M&As represent an important but complex form of 
corporate investment (Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz 2005).  
Second, although there is a well-developed literature examining general career backgrounds, 
ultimately, individuals tend to select into certain initial careers such as military service, accounting, etc.  
Hence, when evaluating operational or policy outcomes, it is very difficult to disentangle the effects 
of the CEO/CFOs’ general background experiences from their innate characteristics. Our setting 
focuses on a former career with aspects that are fairly standard such as forecasting, valuation, and 
conference call interaction. Since these skills are arguably more likely a result of on-the-job experience, 
it allows us to provide some evidence on the debate between the importance of experience versus 
inherent traits for performance outcomes (e.g., Bertrand and Schoar 2003; Adams, Keloharju, and 
Knupfer 2018). 
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2. RELATED LITERATURE AND DISCUSSION 
2.1. Top executive performance outcomes 
The neo-classical view of top executive performance posits that performance outcomes are 
determined by firm-specific and industry factors (Bertrand and Schoar 2003). Even within a standard 
agency framework, individual manager behavior is largely determined by contracting and monitoring 
mechanisms (e.g., Alchian and Demsetz 1972; Jensen and Meckling 1976). For example, the firm can 
be viewed as a team-based productive effort, where required expertise or skill is contracted (Alchian 
Demsetz 1972). More specifically, if a CEO or CFO lacks expertise in a particular area of importance 
such as disclosure or acquisitions, the firm fills this void by hiring someone with the requisite expertise.   
In contrast, upper echelons theory posits that organizational outcomes are, at least in part, 
determined by executives’ individual characteristics (Hambrick and Mason 1984; Hambrick 2007). 
One strand of research building on this theory utilizes a fixed-effect approach to show that top 
executives uniquely impact corporate practices and operations. For instance, Bertrand and Schoar 
(2003) show managers influence a number of corporate outcomes such as investment policy, Dyreng 
et al. (2010) show that executives impact tax avoidance, and Ge et al. (2011) provide evidence of a 
significant CFO effect on financial reporting choices.  
Delving into the unobserved factors behind executive effects, recent studies examine top 
executive heterogeneity with respect to such aspects as education, personal characteristics, and career 
experience. For example, in a voluntary disclosure setting, Bamber et al. (2010) find managers with 
backgrounds in finance, accounting, legal, and those with military experience provide more 
conservative disclosures. Custódio and Metzger (2013) find CEOs with backgrounds in finance or 
accounting hold less cash, more debt, engage in more share repurchases, and manage financial policies 
more actively. Law and Mills (2017) find that managers with military experience are more conservative 
in their tax planning strategies, as evidenced by smaller tax reserves and fewer tax havens. The 
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common theme in this work is to relate general background experience to current performance 
outcomes.2 
Our interest differs in that we focus on specific career experiences. In particular, we are 
interested in whether unique skill sets carryover to top executives’ performance outcomes with respect 
to related tasks. This focus provides opportunities for new insights. First, it may be of interest to 
boards in need of specific expertise to observe evidence on the transference of unique functional skill 
sets from earlier career experience. Second, individuals select into certain initial careers such as the 
military, accounting, etc. Hence, it is not entirely obvious whether effects of general experience at the 
CEO or CFO level are due to innate characteristics or are acquired on the job. Our setting is arguably 
less susceptible to this dual explanation since earnings forecasting, stock valuation, and even 
conference call interactions are plausibly more tightly linked to on-the-job training and experience. 
2.2. Equity analyst research experience 
 
The equity research analysts we consider are either former sell-side or buy-side analysts.3 Sell-
side and buy-side analysts’ jobs overlap on many key dimensions. Both types of analysts gather 
information from a multitude of sources, including but not limited to SEC filings, financial press, 
investor days, and company visits. In addition, standard features of both jobs are forecasting 
performance and providing valuation judgments (Williams, Moyes and Park 1996; Cheng et al. 2006, 
Healy 2014; Brown, Call, Clement and Sharp 2016).4  
                                                          
2  The work on personality traits follows a similar structure, relating general personality characteristics to specific 
performance outcomes, where top executive narcissism impacts acquisitions (Aktas et al. 2016), sensation seeking shapes 
corporate innovation (Sunder et al. 2017), and overconfidence influences investment efficiency (Malmendier and Tate 
2005). 
   
3 Empirically, we observe about 80% of our sample are former sell-side analysts. 
 
4 The primary differences between the two sets of analysts are buy-side analysts disseminate their research internally, 
typically follow more companies and industries than do the sell-side, and rely on the sell-side to provide access to 
management (Williams et al. 1996, Cheng et al. 2006, Healy 2014, Brown et al. 2016). Important for our setting, both the 
buy-side and sell-side make earnings forecasts, provide stock recommendations, and participate in conference calls on a 
frequent basis. 
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There is scarce empirical evidence on buy-side analysts due to the internal nature of their work 
(Healy 2014). However, a detailed empirical literature devoted to sell-side analysts provides a number 
of career experience insights relevant to our setting. For instance, sell-side analysts are adept at both 
collecting (Ivković and Jegadeesh 2004) and interpreting financial information (Lang and Lundholm 
1996; Frankel, Kothari and Weber 2006). In addition, the quality of their research is important to them 
as it impacts their reputations and career outcomes (Stickel 1992; Mikhail, Walther and Willis 1999; 
Hong, Kubik and Solomon 2000). Studies show evidence of analyst skill acquisition in the sense that 
their research improves over time (Mikhail, Walther and Willis 1997; Clement 1999), and they decipher 
what investors perceive as important and recurring in terms of earnings (Previts, Bricker, Robinson 
and Young 1994; Bradshaw and Sloan 2002). 
2.3. Linking equity analyst experience to executive performance outcomes 
 
2.3.1. Earnings guidance performance  
 
Managers’ earnings forecasts are one of the most important voluntary disclosure mechanisms, 
reducing information asymmetry (Coller and Yohn 1997), impacting analysts’ earnings expectations 
(Baginski and Hassell 1990; Williams 1996), and mitigating litigation concerns (Kasznik and Lev 1995; 
Baginski, Hassell and Kimbrough 2002). Furthermore, managers view their guidance as an important 
vehicle for building a reporting reputation (Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal 2005). The fundamentals 
of forecasting earnings as a manager or as an analyst are similar in the sense that both parties project 
sales growth and expense items (e.g., wages, materials, etc.) while factoring in current industry and 
macro-economic trends. One of the major differences is that managers have direct access to 
disaggregated financial and non-financial information. At first blush, it may seem that CFOs are better 
positioned to impact the quality of earnings guidance due to their direct involvement in the financial 
reporting process. However, it is important to note that CEOs have an important ‘top-down’ influence 
on earnings guidance by prioritizing disclosure quality, evaluating the economic outlook, and having 
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the final decision on issuance (e.g., Aboody and Kasznik 2000; Baik, Farber, and Lee 2011; Cassell et 
al. 2013).5  
2.3.2. M&A performance  
 
Analysts form valuations based on qualitative inputs, as well as multiples such as price-to-
earnings ratio and multi-period DCF models (Demirakos et al. 2004). Since analysts forecast earnings, 
they have readily available inputs to either multiples or models, and there is evidence of this link in 
the sense that analysts who issue more accurate forecasts also issue more profitable stock 
recommendations (Loh and Mian 2006; Ertimur, Sunder and Sunder 2007). Ultimately, analysts’ 
quantitative inputs are combined with an assessment of industry growth potential and the quality of 
the management team to form an overall valuation judgement (Groysberg, Healy, Nohria and Serafeim 
2012). This same combination of a valuation exercise and an assessment of industry and management 
is central to properly pricing an acquisition which is a critical step in the acquisition process (Bruner 
and Perella 2004; DePamphilis 2019).  
3. DATA SOURCES AND KEY VARIABLES  
3.1. Financial data 
We gather management earnings forecasts between 1993 and 2016 from the Institutional 
Brokers' Estimate System (IBES) database. To avoid pre-announcements, we focus on management 
annual earnings forecasts issued prior to the end of the fiscal years for which forecasts are made. When 
there are multiple forecasts available for the same fiscal year, we keep the last forecast. We obtain 
M&A deals from the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) Platinum Mergers and Acquisitions database 
for the period 1993 to 2016. Following prior literature, we require the acquirers to be U.S. firms and 
                                                          
5 Beyond the ability to contract for disclosure expertise, there are additional reasons why CEO/CFOs with analyst 
experience may not yield disclosure quality that differs from that of other executives. First, managers may not forecast as 
fully or precisely as possible due to proprietary costs (e.g., Wang 2007; Bamber and Cheon 1998). Second, managers may 
strategically bias their voluntary earnings guidance to walk-down earnings benchmarks (Bergman and Roychowdhury 2007; 
Cotter, Tuna and Wysocki 2006) or due to equity incentives (Aboody and Kasznik 2000; Cheng and Lo 2006). 
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the minimum deal value to be $1 million (Cai and Sevilir 2012). Our conference call sample, obtained 
from Bushee et al. (2018), covers the period 2002 through 2015. All other financial variables are from 
the Compustat and CRSP databases. 
3.2. Former equity research analyst experience 
We manually identify executives who have equity research analyst experience as either sell-side 
or buy-side analysts. Specifically, we begin with the Individual Profile Employment dataset of the 
BoardEx database to obtain the names of public companies' CEO/CFOs and their director IDs from 
1990 to 2017. The database provides a variable RoleName to describe job titles and a variable 
FulltextDescription describing job responsibilities in detail. We search key words ‘chief executive officer’, 
‘CEO’, ‘chief finance officer’, ‘chief financial officer’, or ‘CFO’ in these two variables to identify 
CEO/CFOs. Next, we use director IDs to obtain their previous employment records in BoardEx. To 
identify prior work experience as equity research analysts, we search keywords such as ‘analyst’, ‘equity 
research’, and ‘research associate’ in the job title and description variables. Since these keywords may 
be related to analysts in other job categories (e.g., marketing analysts), we verify equity research analyst 
experience with one or more of the following additional sources: LinkedIn, Bloomberg, Morningstar, 
Brokercheck, and The Wall Street Journal. Our variable of interest is Former Analyst, which takes a 
value of one if a firm's CEO/CFO in a given fiscal year has prior work experience as an equity research 
analyst and zero otherwise. A point we wish to emphasize: across our regressions, the benchmark for 
the former analyst executives (the zeros) is comprised firms which do not have a CEO/CFO with 
research analyst experience but have the option, either exercised or not, to hire or contract for requisite 
experience in disclosure, acquisitions, and investor communications.   
Table 1 provides summary statistics for the former analyst CEO/CFOs in our main tests. 
After merging with necessary financial data for our analyses, our sample observations of CEO/CFOs 
with analyst experience in terms of firm-years (unique former analysts) are as follows: accuracy and 
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relative accuracy tests 203 (64) and 160 (54), respectively; M&A performance tests 116 (33); conference 
call tests 852 (60); and ROA performance 181 (55) and equity return performance 191 (61). Although 
these sample sizes are not large, they are in line with prior work investigating a focused sample of 
CEO background characteristics (e.g., Davidson et al. 2015; Neyland 2016; Sunder et al. 2017).6 
4. RESEARCH DESIGN AND RESULTS  
4.1. Management earnings forecast accuracy 
Model specification and descriptive statistics 
We capture the accuracy of  management earnings forecasts with two approaches. First, we 
measure Accuracy as the absolute value of  management forecast error multiplied by (-1). The error is 
defined as forecasted EPS (point or midpoint of  the range forecast) minus actual EPS, divided by 
logged assets per share. 
Second, we evaluate a relative accuracy measure, Relative Accuracy, which benchmarks 
management forecast errors to that of  the trailing analyst consensus. Specifically, relative accuracy is 
the absolute difference between the median analyst forecast in the 60 days before the management 
forecast and the actual EPS minus the absolute difference between the management forecast and the 
actual EPS, divided by the absolute difference between the median analyst forecast in 60 days before 
the management forecast and the actual EPS. 
Relative 
Accuracy 
 = Abs(median analyst forecast - actual EPS) - Abs(management forecast - actual EPS)  
Abs(median analyst forecast - actual EPS) 
(1) 
Following prior studies (Ajinkya, Bhojraj and Sengupta 2005; Cassell, Huang and Sanchez 2013), 
we control for a broad set of  variables, including firm size (Size), analyst following (Analyst Following), 
industry litigation risk (Litigate), book-to-market ratio (B/M), companies with negative earnings (Loss), 
                                                          
6 Specifically, Davidson et al. (2015) identify 27 CEOs with legal records, Neyland (2016) examines 79 CEOs with divorces, 
and Sunder et al. (2017) identify 88 CEOs who are airplane pilots. 
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the number of  days between the forecast date and the fiscal period end (Horizon), analysts’ earnings 
forecast disagreement (Analyst Dispersion), whether current quarter earnings are higher than that of  the 
same quarter in last year (News), earnings volatility over the past five years (Earnings Volatility), equity 
beta (Beta), the post-Regulation FD period (Reg FD), stock return performance (Return), monthly stock 
return volatility during the fiscal year (Return Volatility), and industry competition (HHI). Appendix B 
provides detailed variable definitions. 
We estimate the impact of  prior analyst working experience on management forecast accuracy 
using the following OLS regression models, where indexes for firm and year are omitted for brevity: 
Accuracy  = α0 + α1 ∙ Former Analyst + Firm Controls + Industry Effects  
    +  Year Effects + 1 
(2) 
 
Relative 
Accuracy 
 = β0 + β 1 ∙ Former Analyst + Firm Controls + Industry Effects  
    +  Year Effects + 2 
(3) 
 A positive (negative) coefficient estimate on Former Analyst indicates that former analyst 
executives provide earnings guidance that is more (less) accurate than that of  other executives. For all 
regressions in this study, continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1 percentiles, and 
the t-statistics are clustered by firm and year to address cross-sectional and time-series dependence 
(Gow, Ormazabal and Taylor 2010).  
Table 2, Panel A provides descriptive statistics of  the variables used in our regression analysis 
involving management forecasts. The median value of  Relative Accuracy is 0.273, suggesting that analyst 
forecast errors are greater than management forecast errors for the majority of  the sample firms. That 
is, management forecasts, in general, are more accurate than analyst forecasts. The mean and median 
values of  Accuracy are -0.089 and -0.019, respectively. 
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Multivariate results 
Table 3 reports the OLS regressions results of  Equation (1). In Column (1) where the dependent 
variable is Accuracy, we find that the coefficient estimate on Former Analyst is positive (0.024) and 
statistically significant at the 5% level, indicating former analyst executives provide more accurate 
management forecasts than other executives. In terms of  economic significance, the result indicates 
that earnings forecasts provided by executives with prior analyst working experience are 27.2% more 
accurate than the forecast accuracy of  the average guidance in our sample.7  
Turning to our control variables, the coefficient estimates are generally consistent with prior 
empirical work. Specifically, management forecast accuracy is positively related to stock returns 
(Return), analyst coverage (Analyst Following) and positive earnings surprises (News), indicating that good 
firm performance and analyst monitoring increase managers’ willingness to issue accurate 
management forecasts. Consistent with Ajinkya et al. (2005), we find that managers provide more 
accurate forecasts when there is considerable disagreement among analysts (Analyst Dispersion). We 
also document a negative association between management forecast accuracy and earnings uncertainty 
(Earnings Volatility) and negative firm performance (Loss). Finally, the coefficient on firm size (Size) is 
significantly negative, which is possibly due to collinearity as there are many other variables such as 
analyst following also capturing firm size. To investigate further, we compute the Pearson correlation 
coefficient between firm size and management forecast accuracy and find the correlation to be 
significantly positive (0.148), suggesting larger firms have more accurate management forecasts. 
                                                          
7 Calculated as the average increase in accuracy by former analysts divided by the absolute mean of accuracy in the sample 
= 0.0242 / |-0.089| = 27.19%. 
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Column (2) presents the regression results in which the dependent variable is Relative Accuracy. 
Consistent with the results in Column (1), we find the coefficient on Former Analyst to be positive 
(0.218) and statistically significant at the 5% level. This finding indicates that forecasts made by former 
analyst executives are more accurate than other executives within a design that directly controls for 
firm-period effects. 
 
4.2. Merger and acquisition performance 
Model specification and descriptive statistics 
We examine M&A performance by regressing the short-window return, Performance, associated 
with the acquisition announcement on our variable of  interest, Former Analyst, and control variables. 
Following prior literature on M&A performance (e.g., Cai and Sevilir 2012; Masulis, Wang and Xie 
2007), we measure Performance as either the cumulative or buy-and-hold abnormal returns in the five-
day event window (-2, +2) centered on the M&A announcement date. The abnormal returns are 
calculated based on either the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model or the Carhart (1997) four-
factor model and estimated over the 200 trading days ending two months before the M&A 
announcement. As Cai and Sevilir (2012) note, this choice of the estimation period minimizes potential 
bias in M&A performance due to investor anticipation or information leakage before the M&A 
announcement date. 
Following Cai and Sevilir (2012) and Huang, Jiang, Lie and Yang (2014), we include acquirer 
characteristics, target characteristics and deal characteristics as control variables for M&A 
performance. Acquirer characteristics include the book-to-market ratio (B/M), firm size (Log total 
assets), Tobin's Q, return on assets (ROA), Sales Growth, total liabilities scaled by assets (Leverage), and 
returns over the 200-day trailing period (Stock Price Run-Up). We also control for target characteristics 
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including whether the target is a public firm (Public Target) and whether it is a domestic firm (Domestic 
Target). Relevant deal characteristics include the deal value relative to the acquirer’s market value 
(Relative Deal Size), as well as indicators for the existence of greater than 5% pre-acquisition ownership 
by the acquirer (Toehold), Competing Offer, 100% stock deals (Stock Deal), 100% cash deals (Cash Deal), 
diversifying acquisitions (Diversifying Acquisition), tender offers (Tender Offer), and hostile takeovers 
(Hostile). Appendix B provides detailed variable definitions. 
Based on the preceding discussion, we estimate the following OLS regression model, where 
indexes for firm and year are omitted for brevity: 
 Performance  = γ0 + γ1 ∙ Former Analyst + Acquirer Controls + Target Controls  
    + Deal Controls + Industry Effects + Year Effects + 3 
(4) 
  
A positive (negative) coefficient estimate on Former Analyst indicates that acquiring firms led by 
former analyst executives experience higher (lower) returns during M&A announcements than those 
of  other executives.  
Table 2, Panel B presents descriptive statistics of  variables used in the M&A tests. The median 
cumulative or buy-and-hold abnormal returns during the 5-day M&A announcement window range 
between 0.003 and 0.004. Among M&As made by our sample firms, 18.9% of  deals involve public 
targets and 85.6% of  deals involve domestic targets. In terms of  financing methods, only 6.9% of  
M&A transactions use only equity financing, while 41.8% of  M&As use only cash financing. 
Multivariate results 
Table 4 reports the OLS regression results. After controlling for standard firm, target and deal 
characteristics, we find that acquirers whose CEO/CFOs have prior analyst working experience are 
associated with announcement returns that range between 1.07% and 1.18% higher than those of  
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other executives.8 This result is consistent with our contention that stock picking and valuations skills 
developed at an earlier career stage helps executives better identify and value acquisition targets, 
resulting in more successful acquisitions. In economic terms, the effect translates to an increase in 
shareholder value ranging between $132.7 and $146.3 million for the average former analyst-led 
acquirer in our sample.9  
The coefficient estimates on the control variables are generally consistent with prior literature. 
Similar to Moeller et al. (2005) and Masulis et al. (2007), we find acquirer size and stock price run-up 
are negatively associated with announcement returns, while acquirer leverage and deal size relative to 
the size of  the acquirer are positively associated with announcement returns. In line with the findings 
in Huang et al. (2014), we find acquisitions involving cash financing or tender offers experience higher 
announcement returns, whereas acquisitions in which acquirers possesses a toehold in targets and 
acquisitions involving public targets, diversifying investments, and competing offers are associated 
with lower announcement returns. 
 
4.3. Former analyst CEO/CFOs earnings guidance accuracy and M&A performance: 
Cross-sectional evidence from past performance 
 
The preceding analyses relies on the assumption that former equity analysts gained skills in 
earnings forecasting and stock valuation, later applying these skills to the related tasks of  providing 
management earnings forecasts and valuing M&A targets. Since the former analysts in our sample 
                                                          
8 Although short-window announcement returns are commonly used in the literature to evaluate the quality of M&As, we 
also examine one-year cumulative and buy-and-hold abnormal returns during the post-acquisition period to proxy for the 
M&A quality. In untabulated tests, we continue to find acquirers whose CEO/CFOs have prior analyst working experience 
are associated with higher one-year cumulative and buy-and-hold abnormal returns.  
 
9 Calculated as the mean of acquirers’ market capitalization multiplied by the average increase in stock returns: $12.4 billion 
* 1.07% = $132.68 million and $12.4 billion * 1.18% = $146.32 million. 
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have an average of  6.8 years of  experience as equity analysts, this seems like a reasonable assumption. 
However, to tighten this link, we examine whether former analysts who were better at earnings 
forecasting or stock selection are associated with more accurate earnings guidance or more successful 
M&A, respectively.  
We begin by matching our sample of  former analyst CEO/CFOs to the IBES database. This is 
a tedious process which we outline in detail in Appendix A. The end result is that we are able to 
assemble earnings forecasting performance records for 18 unique analysts (representing 40 analyst 
firm-years) for use in a guidance accuracy analysis, and we assemble stock recommendation 
performance records for 9 unique analysts (representing 33 firm-years) for an M&A analysis.  
In the accuracy model, we evaluate Relative Accuracy since it directly controls for firm-period 
effects, and replace the Former Analyst variable with better and worse former analyst earnings 
forecasters. We define Better (Worse) Forecaster as equal to one if  the CEO/CFO is a former analyst and 
had better (worse) forecast ability as an analyst, where forecast ability is defined as better (worse) if  
past relative forecast accuracy is higher (lower) than the median IBES analyst in our sample and equal 
to zero otherwise. 
We modify the M&A performance model in a similar fashion by replacing Former Analyst with 
better and worse former analyst stock recommenders. We define Better (Worse) Recommender as equal to 
one if  the CEO/CFO is a former analyst and had better (worse) recommendation profitability, where 
recommendation profitability is identified as better (worse) if  past recommendation profitability is 
higher (lower) than the median IBES analyst in our sample and equal to zero otherwise. 
Recommendation profitability is measured as the one-year market-adjusted returns following an 
analyst's strong buy or buy recommendation, or one-year returns times (-1) following an analyst's 
underperform or sell recommendation. 
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Based on the preceding discussion, we specify the following OLS regression models, where 
indexes for firm and year are omitted for brevity: 
Relative 
Accuracy 
 = δ0 + δ 1 ∙ Better forecaster + δ 2 ∙ Worse forecaster + Firm Controls  
    + Industry Effects + Year Effects + 4 
(5) 
 
Performance  = λ0 + λ 1 ∙ Better recommender + λ 2 ∙Worse recommender + Acquirer Controls  
    + Target Controls + Deal Controls + Industry Effects + Year Effects + 5 
(6) 
 
We expect positive coefficient estimates on the Better Forecaster and Better Recommender variables; 
however, the estimates on the Worse Forecaster and Worse Recommender variables are an empirical question 
since it may be below-median analysts are sufficiently skilled in forecasting and stock valuation to 
provide benefits to their earnings guidance and M&A performance, respectively.  
Multivariate results 
 
Table 5 reports the results of  the OLS regressions. Consistent with our expectations, we find the 
coefficient on Better Forecaster is positive (0.515) and statistically significant at the 5% level. While Worse 
Forecaster is also positively associated with Relative Accuracy, it is not statistically significant at 
conventional levels. Similarly, we document a significant positive association between Better 
Recommender and acquisition announcement returns, while Worse Recommender does not appear to have 
a significant effect on announcement returns. Together, the results indicate that CEOs/CFOs who 
are better skilled former analysts have superior performance in forecasting earnings and leading 
successful acquisitions. This, in turn, is consistent with our contention that earnings forecasting and 
stock picking skills developed at an early career stage play an important role in management forecasts 
and M&As. 
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4.4. Earnings conference call interactions  
Beyond forecasting earnings and recommending stocks, analysts frequently participate in 
conference calls where they interact with management during the Q&A sessions. Analysts view these 
calls as important since these interactions provide them with public information that can complement 
their private information sets (Mayew 2008; Chen and Matsumoto 2006). For executives, conference 
calls are important as well, providing an important corporate disclosure channel which allows CEOs 
and CFOs to efficiently communicate with large numbers of analysts and portfolio managers (Frankel, 
Johnson and Skinner 1999). We conjecture that conference call experience acquired as an equity 
analyst should help executives anticipate and prepare for questions, resulting in more certainty in their 
answers.  
Model specification 
We evaluate former analyst executives’ conference call interactions by regressing Managerial 
Answer Certainty on our variable of  interest, Former Analyst, and control variables for firm growth, size, 
stock returns, stock uncertainty, earnings uncertainty and analyst uncertainty (i.e., B/M, Size, Return, 
Return Volatility, Earnings Volatility, and Analyst Dispersion). The dependent variable Managerial Answer 
Certainty is the percentage of  words in a CEO/CFO's answers to analyst questions during a conference 
call that make answers more uncertain multiplied by -100. The ‘uncertain’ direction of  the coding 
originates with Loughran and McDonald (2011), which we transform to ease the discussion of  the 
results (i.e., managers are ‘more certain’ as opposed to ‘less uncertain’). Answers providing greater 
certainty with respect to firm performance are particularly important when analysts are seeking 
forward-looking information. Hence, we identify forward-looking questions asked by analysts, Forward-
Looking Questions, based on Li (2010). In cross-sectional tests, we interact quintile rank and indicator 
versions of  the Forward-Looking Questions variable with Former Analyst to examine whether the 
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CEO/CFOs with prior analyst experience provide more certain answers when being asked forward-
looking questions by analysts. 
 Based on the preceding discussion, we specify the following OLS regression model, where 
indexes for firm and year are omitted for brevity: 
Managerial 
Answer 
Certainty 
 = θ0 + θ1 ∙ Former Analyst + θ2 ∙ Forward-Looking Questions  
    + θ3 ∙ Former Analyst ∙ Forward-Looking Questions + Firm Controls  
    + Industry Effects + Year Effects + 7 
(7) 
  
A positive (negative) coefficient estimate on Former Analyst indicates that former analyst 
executives provide answers that are more (less) certain than that of  other executives. A positive 
(negative) coefficient estimate on the interaction Former Analyst ∙ Forward-Looking Questions indicates 
that former analyst executives provide answers to forward-looking questions that are more (less) 
certain than that of  other executives. 
Multivariate results 
 Table 6 reports the OLS regression results. We find that former analyst executives provide 
greater certainty in their answers to analyst questions during conference calls as evidenced by a 
significant and positive coefficient estimate on the Former Analyst variable (0.046) in Column (1). This 
effect is economically significant as well. Specifically, executives with former equity research experience 
provide 13.3% greater certainty when answering analysts’ questions than do other executives, after 
controlling for determinants of  the managerial certainty.10 In the second column, the coefficient 
estimate on the interaction between Former Analyst and the quintile Forward-Looking Questions is 
significantly positive (0.0103), while the estimate on the lower-order term Former Analyst is insignificant. 
The combined finding implies that the certainty effect is important only when there is some degree 
                                                          
10 13.34% is equal to the coefficient estimate 0.0461 divided by the absolute mean value of the managerial certainty variable 
0.3455. 
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of  forward-looking nature to analysts’ questions. In the third column, the coefficient estimate on the 
interaction term between Former Analyst and the top quintile Forward-Looking Questions is significantly 
positive (0.0260) and the estimate on the lower-order term Former Analyst is also significant and positive 
(0.0408), implying former analyst executives provide even greater certainty when faced with the most 
forward-looking questions. 
4.5. Overall firm performance 
Model specification 
Although former analyst executives appear able at tasks such as providing earnings guidance, 
M&A, and conference call participation, it is an open question whether their firms perform well overall. 
To answer this question, we examine firm performance by regressing Firm Performance on our variable 
of  interest, Former Analyst, and control variables. Specifically, we use two types of  performance 
variables to measure Firm Performance. The first one is return on assets, ROA, which is net income 
divided by total assets. The second type is stock return performance based on either cumulative or 
buy-and-hold abnormal returns over the fiscal year performance window. The abnormal returns are 
calculated using either the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model or Carhart (1997) four-factor 
model estimated over the 150 trading days ending 15 days before the fiscal year starts. We require a 
minimum of  90 non-missing daily returns in the estimation window. 
Based on prior studies evaluating firm performance (e.g., Anderson and Reeb 2003), we 
control for firm size (Size), stock return volatility (Return Volatility), research and development expense 
dummy (R&D),  and firm age (Age). In addition, we control for recent earnings volatility (Earnings 
Volatility), analyst following (Analyst Following), the legal environment of  the industry (Litigate), book-
to-market ratio (B/M), analysts’ earnings forecast disagreement (Analyst Dispersion), and industry 
competition (HHI). Detailed variable definitions can be found in Appendix B. 
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Based on the preceding discussion, we specify the following OLS regression model, where 
indexes for firm and year are omitted for brevity: 
Firm 
Performance 
 = ξ0 + ξ 1 ∙ Former Analyst + Firm Controls + Industry Effects  
      +  Year Effects + 6 
(6) 
  
Based on our definitions of  Firm Performance, a positive (negative) coefficient estimate on 
Former Analyst indicates that former analyst executives’ firms perform better (worse) than those of  
other executives. Table 2, Panel C provides descriptive statistics of  variables used in the overall firm 
performance tests. The median value of  ROA is 0.045, suggesting that our sample firms are profitable 
in the majority of  our firm-years.  
Multivariate results 
Table 7 reports the results of  OLS regressions. We find that firm-years with former analyst 
CEO/CFOs are associated with 3.94% higher ROA and stock returns that range between 7.78% and 
9.55% higher than those of  other executives. In economic terms, this translates to a $64 million 
increase in net income on average, and between $122 and $150 million in additional shareholder 
value.11 Overall, the findings suggest that former analyst executives not only perform better at specific 
tasks—such as guidance, M&A, and conference call interactions—but also their firms exhibit better 
overall performance. 
4.6. Unobserved heterogeneity and former analyst CEO/CFO results 
Discussion and research design 
There may be unobserved heterogeneity that explains why firms hire former analysts. A 
familiar approach to address this issue is to include firm-fixed effects, addressing the concern over 
                                                          
11 The increase in net income is calculated as the average increase in ROA multiplied by the median total assets: 3.94% * 
$1623.64 million = $63.97 million. The increase in shareholder value is calculated as the average increase in stock returns 
multiplied by the median market capitalization in the firm performance sample: 7.78% * $1573.24 million = $122.40 million 
and 9.55% * $1573.24 million = $150.24 million. 
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unobserved time-invariant factors which may confound our estimates.  Since we have a limited sample 
of former analyst CEO/CFOs, this approach would force our identification strategy to rest on the 
even smaller number of former analysts who switch firms. Hence, we cannot include firm-fixed effects 
and derive reliable estimates.  
To mitigate concerns that our results are a manifestation of  unobserved heterogeneity, we 
offer two forms of  placebo tests. In the first test, we label observations as ‘pseudo-former analyst’ 
firm-years during the period of time before and after former analyst CEO/CFOs assume their 
executive roles. For example, a management earnings forecast announced in the year prior to the actual 
tenure of  the former analyst CEO/CFO or after the executive’s last year in office is regarded as issued 
by a pseudo-former analyst and is assigned a value of  one. We re-examine each of  our findings with 
this pseudo-former analyst approach. If  the results we obtain are manifestations of  time-invariant 
firm effects, we are likely to find similar results for pseudo-former analysts as well. 
In the second test, we examine several types of  alternative work experience. The objective is 
to examine whether former analyst experience is picking up related types of career experiences that 
might also be associated with our dependent variables of interest. In particular, we examine general 
analyst skills, financial expertise, and quantitative experience. To proxy for general analyst expertise, 
we identify CEO/CFOs with prior work experience as a financial analyst, but not as an equity research 
analyst. The distinction between this job and that of the equity research analyst is the lack of training 
and experience in our focal job traits: earnings forecasting, stock selection, and conference call 
interactions. 
To proxy for financial expertise, we utilize executives with prior experience in accounting or 
finance. The accounting and finance work experience includes positions such as financial compliance, 
financial assurance, accountant, controller, and bookkeeper. Finally, to proxy for a quantitative 
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background, we identify those with engineering experience, where examples of positions include 
software engineers, civil engineers, facilities engineers, and engineering technicians. 
Multivariate results 
 Table 8, Column 1 shows the results for the pseudo-former analyst executive approach. The 
coefficient estimates on pseudo-former analyst executives are insignificant across all the tests, 
providing evidence that our results are unlikely to be subject to unobservable time-invariant firm 
characteristics. Columns 2 to 4 of Table 8 present the results for CEO/CFOs with general financial 
analyst, accounting/finance, and engineering experience, respectively. The coefficient estimates on 
these alternative working experience variables are not significant at conventional levels for the specific 
tests surrounding guidance accuracy, M&A performance, and certainty in answering conference call 
questions. 12  However, there is evidence CEO/CFOs with accounting/finance backgrounds are 
associated with better overall firm performance. Overall, these two approaches help validate the 
positive associations we find between executives’ previous equity analyst experience and guidance 
accuracy, M&A performance, certainty in answering conference call questions, and firm performance. 
5. CONCLUSION 
Prior work has shown CEO and CFO fixed-effects uniquely impact corporate practices and 
operations. Delving into these effects, recent studies examine general executive traits such as education, 
personal characteristics, and career experience. In contrast, our interest is in specific experience, and 
whether such experience carries over to top executive performance on related tasks. We assemble a 
sample of CEO/CFOs who have prior work experience as equity research analysts. We find these 
former analyst executives provide earnings guidance that is more accurate than that of other executives. 
In fact, our evidence indicates that earnings forecasts provided by former analysts are 27.2% more 
                                                          
12 The lack of statistical significance in these tests is not likely due to small samples sizes as these job categories provide 
larger samples than our category of interest, former research analysts. 
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accurate than other executives. Moreover, we find former analyst-led acquisitions are associated with 
abnormal return premiums to acquisition announcements between 1.1% and 1.2% larger than those 
of other executives. In economic terms, this translates to between $132.7 million and $146.3 million 
in additional shareholder value.   
For a subset of CEO/CFOs, we trace their forecasting and stock picking performance 
histories. The results indicate a positive association between a record of better earnings forecasting 
and more accurate current earnings guidance, as well as a positive association between better stock 
recommendation profitability and current M&A success.  
In addition to forecasting earnings and picking stocks, equity analysts are frequent participants 
in earnings conference calls. We posit that this type of experience should help executives prepare for 
earnings calls and generally navigate the conference call interactions. Consistent with earnings call 
experience, we find executives with analyst experience provide 13.3% more certain answers than do 
other executives.   
Given the evidence of several specific performance advantages, a natural question to 
investigate is how former analysts’ firms perform overall. We examine annual measures of firm 
performance, including an accounting measure of performance, return on assets (ROA), and stock 
return measures, finding consistent evidence that former analysts’ firms exhibit superior performance. 
In terms of economic impact, executives with analyst experience generate $64 million higher net 
income on average and improve shareholder value between $427 and $524 million compared to other 
executives.  
Our paper contributes to the broader literature in accounting and finance that examines the 
impact of top executives’ human capital on corporate performance outcomes. Different from these 
studies, our interest is in whether specific forms of experience carryover to top executive performance. 
This is important for at least two reasons. First, our findings may inform market participants in general 
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and corporate boards in particular that at least in some settings, there appears to be a transference of 
unique skill sets from earlier careers to top executive positions. Second, although there is a well-
developed literature examining general career backgrounds, ultimately, individuals tend to select into 
certain initial careers. Hence, when evaluating operational or policy outcomes, it is very difficult to 
disentangle the effects of the CEO/CFO’s general background from the innate characteristics which, 
in part, placed them on a particular career path. In contrast, our setting focuses on specific skills that 
are part of on-the-job experience, resulting in evidence that is arguably less likely driven by inherent 
traits.  
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APPENDIX A 
Steps to Identify Former Analyst CEO/CFOs in the IBES Database 
1. Match former analyst CEO/CFOs to the IBES recommendation file which contains analysts’ last 
names and the first initial of their first names.  
2. Hand-check the name-based matching to avoid errors caused by people with the same last name 
and first initial of the first name. The sources we rely on for hand-checking include at least one of 
the following: LinkedIn, BoardEx employment information, Bloomberg CEO/CFO profiles, 
Morningstar executive profiles, Brokercheck analyst profiles, Wall Street Journal executive profiles, 
Google searches, news articles, and press releases.  
3. Based on (1) and (2), we obtain the IBES Estimator ID representing an analyst’s brokerage 
identifier (which is a different ID in the recommendation versus the forecast databases) and an 
analyst’s individual IBES Analyst ID (which is the same ID in both recommendation and forecast 
databases). 
4. Merge the Estimator ID with the IBES analyst translation file to obtain brokerage names since 
IBES does not directly provide brokerage names. If an Estimator ID does not have a matched 
brokerage name in the translation file, we use one of the sources above—i.e., LinkedIn, etc.—to 
obtain the brokerage name. 
5. Verify the employment history match between the CEO/CFO BoardEx records and IBES 
records. This step is necessary because different analysts may have the same last name, the same 
initial of first name, and the same brokerage employer. For example, Ross Taylor, CFO of Abaxis 
Inc., has sell-side analyst experience at Smith Barney from 1996 to 1999 (data source: BoardEx, 
LinkedIn and Bloomberg). However, there are two R. Taylor IBES analysts who worked at Smith 
Barney. The first was R. Taylor (IBES ID: 78814) from 2002 to 2017, and the second was R. 
Taylor (IBES ID: 43707) from 1997 to 1999. Without verification of employment history, we 
would not be able to correctly match the latter IBES analyst ID to Ross Taylor the CFO.   
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Appendix B 
Variable Definitions 
Dependent Variables: 
1) Management Forecast Measures: 
Accuracy Absolute value of management forecast error multiplied by (-1), where error is defined as 
management forecast of EPS (point or midpoint of the range forecast) minus actual EPS, divided 
by logged assets per share.  
 
Relative Accuracy Absolute difference between prior 60-day median analyst forecast and actual EPS minus the 
absolute difference between management forecast and actual EPS, divided by the absolute 
difference between prior 60-day median analyst forecast and actual EPS. 
2) Firm Performance Measures: 
ROA Net income divided by total assets in the fiscal year. 
 
Three-Factor/Four-Factor 
CAR 
Cumulative abnormal return (CAR) in the fiscal year, where abnormal return is computed using 
the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model or Carhart (1997) four-factor model. 
 
Three-Factor/Four-Factor 
BHAR 
Buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) in the fiscal year, where abnormal return is computed 
using the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model or Carhart (1997) four-factor model. 
3) M&A Performance Measures: 
Three-Factor/Four-Factor 
CAR (-2, +2) 
Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) during the event window (-2, +2) using Fama and French 
(1993) three-factor model or Carhart (1997) four-factor model.  
Three-Factor/Four-Factor 
BHAR (-2, +2) 
Buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) during the event window (-2, +2) using Fama and 
French (1993) three-factor model or Carhart (1997) four-factor model.  
Independent Variable of Interest in Main Tests: 
Former Analyst Equals one if the firm's CEO/CFO in the fiscal year has equity research analyst working 
experience and equals zero otherwise. 
Independent Variables of Interest in Cross-Sectional Tests: 
Better (Worse) Forecaster Equals one if the former analyst CEO/CFO had better (worse) forecast performance, where 
forecast performance is identified as better (worse) if the past relative forecast accuracy of this 
former analyst is higher than or equal to (less than) the median relative forecast accuracy of all 
IBES analysts in our sample and equals zero otherwise. 
  
Better (Worse) Recommender Equals one if the former analyst CEO/CFO had better (worse) stock recommendation 
performance, where stock recommendation performance is identified as better (worse) if the past 
stock recommendation performance is higher than or equal to (less than) the median stock 
recommendation performance of all IBES analysts in our sample and equals zero otherwise.  
Control Variables: 
1) Accuracy and Firm Performance Tests: 
Raw stock return Cumulative monthly raw stock return during the fiscal year. 
Return Volatility Standard deviation of monthly raw stock returns during the fiscal year. 
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B/M Ratio of book value to market value of common equity at the beginning of the fiscal year. 
Size Natural logarithm of market value of equity at the beginning of the fiscal year. 
Earnings Volatility Standard deviation of annual earnings over 5 years ending at fiscal year-end, divided by median 
asset value for the 5 years. 
HHI Hirschman-Herfindahl (HH) index, calculated as the summation of squared market share (i.e., 
sale percentage) of each firm within industry in the fiscal year. 
R&D Equals one if research and development expense is greater than zero in the fiscal year and equals 
zero otherwise. 
Horizon Management forecast horizon, measured as the number of days between the management 
earnings forecast announcement date and fiscal year end. 
Analyst Following Natural logarithm of one plus the number of unique analysts who follow the firm in the fiscal 
year. 
News Equals one if the current fiscal-year EPS is greater than or equal to the last fiscal-year EPS and 
equals zero otherwise. 
Reg FD Equals one if the observation is related to the post-Reg FD period (after October 2000), and 
equals zero otherwise. 
Beta Equity beta using daily stock returns and value-weighted market index returns for the past 250 
trading days ending at the fiscal year end, with a min. of 60 trading days. 
Loss Equals one if the firm reports a loss in the fiscal year, and equals zero otherwise. 
Litigate Equals one for all firms in the biotechnology, computers, electronics and retail industries, and 
equals zero otherwise. 
Analyst Dispersion Standard deviation of analyst annual earnings forecasts divided by the median analyst forecast 
prior to the management earnings forecast announcement date. 
Age Natural logarithm of number of years that have elapsed since the firm started in Compustat. 
2) M&A Performance Tests: 
Acquirer Characteristics:  
Log (total assets) Natural logarithm of total assets at the end of the fiscal year. 
Tobin's Q Market value of equity plus the book value of short- and long-term debt scaled by total assets 
measured at the end of the fiscal year. 
ROA Net income divided by total assets in the fiscal year. 
Sales Growth Sales in the current fiscal year minus sales in the last fiscal year divided by sales in the last fiscal 
year. 
Leverage Total liabilities divided by total assets at the end of the fiscal year. 
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Stock Price Run-Up Buy-and-hold market-adjusted return (BHAR) during the 200 trading days ending two months 
before the M&A announcement date. 
Target Characteristics:  
Public Target Equals one for public target, and equals zero otherwise. 
Domestic Target Equals one if the target is a domestic company, and equals zero otherwise. 
Deal Characteristics:  
Relative Deal Size Deal value divided by acquirer's market value of equity. 
Toehold Equals one if the acquirer holds 5% or more of the target stock prior to the M&A announcement 
date, and equals zero otherwise. 
Competing Offer Equals one if a deal has competing bidders as identified by SDC, and equals zero otherwise. 
Stock Deal Equals one for deals that are paid for 100% in stock, and equals zero otherwise. 
Cash Deal Equals one for deals that are paid for 100% in cash, and equals zero otherwise. 
Diversifying Acquisition Equals one if the target and the acquirer have different two-digit SIC codes, and equals zero 
otherwise. 
Tender Offer Equals one for tender offers as identified by SDC, and equals zero otherwise. 
Hostile Equals one if the acquisition was classified as hostile by SDC, and equals zero otherwise. 
Conference Call Variables:  
Managerial Answer Certainty Percentage of words in a CEO or a CFO's answers to analyst questions during a conference call 
that make answers more ‘uncertain’ multiplied by (-100), where uncertain words are from 
Loughran and McDonald (2011). 
 
Analyst Forward-Looking 
Questions 
Proportion of sentences containing forward-looking statements during the analyst questions of 
a conference call, where forward-looking statements are from Li (2010). 
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Table 1 
Summary Statistics of Former Analyst CEO/CFOs for Main Tests 
Panel A. Number of Former Analysts in Accuracy Tests 
  
Accuracy 
  
Relative Accuracy 
Firm-years 
Unique  
analysts 
Firm-years 
Unique  
analysts 
Total 16,723 100.00%   13,191 100.00%  
     Non-Former Analysts 16,520 98.79%   13,031 98.79%  
     Former Analysts 203 1.21% 64   160 1.21% 54 
 
Panel B. Number of Former Analysts in M&A Performance Tests 
  
M&A Performance 
3-Factor CAR (BHAR)  4-Factor CAR (BHAR) 
Firm-years 
Unique  
Analysts 
 Firm-years 
Unique  
Analysts 
Total 7,981 100.00%   7,981 100.00%  
     Non-Former Analysts 7,865 98.55%   7,865 98.55%  
     Former Analysts 116 1.45% 33  116 1.45% 33 
 
Panel C. Number of Former Analysts in Conference Call Tests 
  
Managerial Answer Certainty 
Base Model  Forward-Looking Questions 
Firm-quarters 
Unique  
Analysts 
 Firm-quarters 
Unique  
Analysts 
Total 48,359 100.00%   48,359 100.00%  
     Non-Former Analysts 47,507 98.24%   47,507 98.24%  
     Former Analysts 852 1.76% 60  852 1.76% 60 
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Panel D. Number of Former Analysts in Firm Performance Tests 
  
Firm Performance 
ROA  CAR (BHAR) 
Firm-quarters 
Unique  
Analysts 
 Firm-quarters 
Unique  
Analysts 
Total 14,197 100.00%   14,770 100.00%  
  Non-Former Analysts 14,016 98.73%   14,579 98.71%  
  Former Analysts 181 1.27% 55  191 1.29% 61 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A. Accuracy Test Variables 
  N   Mean   S.D.   Min   P25   Median   P75   Max 
Relative Accuracy 13,191  -0.154  1.927  -12.600  -0.123  0.273  0.750  1.000 
Accuracy 16,723  -0.089  0.243  -1.862  -0.056  -0.019  -0.007  0.000 
Former Analyst 16,723  0.012  0.110  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  1.000 
Return 16,723  0.138  0.489  -0.794  -0.157  0.097  0.344  2.138 
Return Volatility 16,723  0.112  0.067  0.029  0.066  0.096  0.139  0.382 
B/M 16,723  0.489  0.346  -0.097  0.252  0.419  0.637  1.933 
Size 16,723  7.147  1.714  3.102  6.000  7.077  8.259  11.645 
Earnings Volatility 16,723  0.059  0.083  0.002  0.016  0.031  0.066  0.538 
HHI 16,723  0.237  0.192  0.014  0.103  0.185  0.309  0.996 
R&D 16,723  0.441  0.496  0.000  0.000  0.000  1.000  1.000 
Horizon 16,723  114.461  100.941  9.000  58.000  68.000  154.000  485.000 
Analyst Following 16,723  9.155  6.919  0.000  4.000  7.000  13.000  31.000 
Log (Analyst Following+1) 16,723  2.063  0.760  0.000  1.609  2.079  2.639  3.466 
News 16,723  0.615  0.487  0.000  0.000  1.000  1.000  1.000 
FD 16,723  0.905  0.294  0.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000 
Beta 16,723  1.010  0.485  0.025  0.680  0.974  1.292  2.502 
Loss 16,723  0.155  0.361  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  1.000 
Litigate 16,723  0.316  0.465  0.000  0.000  0.000  1.000  1.000 
Analyst Dispersion 16,723   0.022   0.071   -0.283   0.004   0.011   0.025   0.440 
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Panel B. M&A Test Variables 
  N   Mean   S.D.   Min   P25   Median   P75   Max 
Three-Factor CAR (-2, +2) 7,981  0.007  0.067  -0.210  -0.023  0.004  0.035  0.304 
Three-Factor BHAR (-2, +2) 7,981  0.007  0.068  -0.207  -0.024  0.003  0.034  0.312 
Four-Factor CAR (-2, +2) 7,981  0.007  0.068  -0.212  -0.023  0.004  0.035  0.305 
Four-Factor BHAR (-2, +2) 7,981  0.007  0.069  -0.210  -0.024  0.003  0.035  0.312 
B/M 7,981  0.483  0.337  0.048  0.261  0.405  0.605  2.480 
Log (total assets) 7,981  7.775  1.818  2.383  6.493  7.659  8.986  13.305 
Tobin's Q 7,981  2.032  1.278  0.659  1.234  1.639  2.314  8.870 
ROA 7,981  0.042  0.092  -0.941  0.018  0.047  0.079  0.237 
Sales Growth 7,981  0.262  0.587  -0.865  0.044  0.134  0.285  6.907 
Leverage 7,981  0.247  0.182  0.000  0.100  0.234  0.369  0.847 
Stock Price Run-Up 7,981  0.127  0.541  -1.042  -0.113  0.053  0.256  13.616 
Public Target 7,981  0.189  0.392  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  1.000 
Domestic Target 7,981  0.856  0.351  0.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000 
Relative Deal Size 7,981  0.115  0.232  0.000  0.011  0.037  0.109  2.086 
Toehold 7,981  0.041  0.199  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  1.000 
Competing Offer 7,981  0.010  0.100  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  1.000 
Stock Deal 7,981  0.069  0.254  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  1.000 
Cash Deal 7,981  0.418  0.493  0.000  0.000  0.000  1.000  1.000 
Diversifying Acquisition 7,981  0.404  0.491  0.000  0.000  0.000  1.000  1.000 
Tender Offer 7,981  0.052  0.222  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  1.000 
Hostile 7,981   0.001   0.035   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   1.000 
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Panel C: Conference Call Test Variables 
  N   Mean   S.D.   Min   P25   Median   P75   Max 
Managerial Answer Certainty 48,359  -0.346  0.154  -0.791  -0.439  -0.328  -0.235  -0.052 
Forward-Looking Questions 48,359  0.237  0.069  0.000  0.192  0.231  0.275  1.000 
Quintile Rank Forward-
Looking Questions 
48,359  1.987  1.416  0.000  1.000  2.000  3.000  4.000 
Top Quintile Forward-Looking 
Questions 
48,359  0.198  0.399  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  1.000 
B/M 48,359  0.456  0.325  -0.473  0.244  0.399  0.606  2.773 
Size 48,359  7.667  1.538  2.860  6.600  7.594  8.671  11.598 
Raw Stock Return 48,359  0.154  0.427  -0.823  -0.090  0.128  0.338  2.391 
Return Volatility 48,359  0.094  0.051  0.029  0.058  0.082  0.116  0.398 
Earnings Volatility 48,359  0.049  0.071  0.002  0.014  0.028  0.055  0.726 
Analyst Dispersion 48,359   0.036   0.046   -0.024   0.012   0.022   0.043   0.209 
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Panel D. Firm Performance Test Variables 
  N   Mean   S.D.   Min   P25   Median   P75   Max 
ROA 14,197  0.023  0.231  -9.130  0.014  0.045  0.082  0.410 
Three-Factor CAR (one year) 14,770  -0.046  0.638  -2.506  -0.357  -0.035  0.271  2.821 
Three-Factor BHAR (one year) 14,770  -0.257  1.193  -11.919  -0.479  -0.085  0.230  2.661 
Four-Factor CAR (one year) 14,770  -0.046  0.643  -2.541  -0.359  -0.032  0.277  2.807 
Four-Factor BHAR (one year) 14,770  -0.262  1.200  -12.093  -0.485  -0.084  0.232  2.654 
Return Volatility 14,197  0.109  0.067  0.016  0.064  0.093  0.135  0.536 
B/M 14,197  0.461  0.370  -6.173  0.243  0.398  0.608  4.933 
Size 14,197  7.392  1.559  1.033  6.291  7.296  8.442  10.745 
Earnings Volatility 14,197  0.063  0.191  0.000  0.015  0.030  0.062  7.796 
HHI 14,197  0.238  0.191  0.014  0.104  0.186  0.309  0.987 
R&D 14,197  0.443  0.497  0.000  0.000  0.000  1.000  1.000 
Analyst Following 14,197  10.112  6.772  2.000  5.000  8.000  14.000  31.000 
Log (Analyst Following+1) 14,197  2.224  0.618  1.099  1.792  2.197  2.708  3.466 
Litigate 14,197  0.320  0.466  0.000  0.000  0.000  1.000  1.000 
Analyst Dispersion 14,197  0.041  0.098  -0.355  0.012  0.023  0.045  0.614 
Age 14,197   2.952   0.733   0.693   2.398   2.890   3.664   4.025 
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Table 3 
Former Analyst CEO/CFO and Earnings Guidance Accuracy 
This table compares the earnings guidance accuracy of former analyst executives to that of 
other executives. Accuracy is the absolute value of the forecast error multiplied by negative one 
and divided by logged assets per share. Relative accuracy benchmarks management’s forecast 
error to that of the trailing analyst consensus for the same firm-year. Former analyst equals one 
if the firm's CEO/CFO in that fiscal period has equity research analyst working experience 
and zero otherwise. t-statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors which are two-way 
clustered at firm and year level. Detailed definitions of remaining variables are in Appendix B.  
  Dependent Variables: Management Earnings Forecast Accuracy 
 Accuracy   Relative Accuracy 
Former Analyst 0.0242**   0.2180** 
 (1.97)  (2.07) 
Return 0.0372***  0.0119 
 (5.22) 
 (0.30) 
Return Volatility -0.5157***  0.7005 
 (-8.82) 
 (1.50) 
B/M -0.0083  -0.1739** 
 (-0.69) 
 (-2.59) 
Size -0.0154***  -0.0433*** 
 (-6.79) 
 (-3.05) 
Earnings Volatility -0.4505***  -0.3265 
 (-5.99) 
 (-1.38) 
HHI 0.0143  0.1107 
 (1.09) 
 (0.96) 
R&D 0.0022  0.0120 
 (0.39) 
 (0.16) 
Horizon -0.0006***  -0.0006*** 
 (-14.79) 
 (-3.32) 
Analyst Following 0.0474***  0.0703*** 
 (8.21) 
 (3.04) 
News 0.0266***  -0.0179 
 (5.43) 
 (-0.36) 
Reg FD -0.0006  0.3248*** 
 (-0.20) 
 (11.76) 
Beta 0.0076  -0.0840 
  (0.83)   (-1.49) 
Loss -0.1169***   -0.1229 
 (-10.94) 
 (-1.61) 
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Litigate -0.0019  -0.1283 
 (-0.19) 
 (-1.63) 
Analyst Dispersion 0.1919***  -0.5080** 
 (3.74) 
 (-2.56) 
Year Fixed Effect Yes  Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes  Yes 
Clustered Std. Err. Firm & Year  Firm & Year 
# of Observations 16,723  13,191 
Adj. R-Squared 0.253   0.008 
 
 
 
 
44 
 
Table 4 
Former Analyst CEO/CFO and M&A Performance 
This table compares the M&A performance of former analyst executives to that of other 
executives. Three-Factor CAR (BHAR) represents the five-day cumulative (buy-and-hold) 
abnormal returns centered on the acquisition announcement date using the Fama and French 
(1993) three-factor model. Four-Factor CAR (BHAR) represents the five-day cumulative (buy-
and-hold) abnormal returns centered on the acquisition announcement date using the Carhart 
(1997) four-factor model. Former analyst equals one if the firm's CEO/CFO in that fiscal period 
has equity research analyst working experience and zero otherwise. t-statistics in parentheses 
are based on standard errors which are two-way clustered at firm and year level. Detailed 
definitions of remaining variables are in Appendix B.  
  Dependent Variables: Measures of M&A Performance 
 Three-Factor  
CAR  
  
Three-Factor  
BHAR  
  
Four-Factor  
CAR  
  
Four-Factor  
BHAR  
Former Analyst 0.0112**   0.0107**   0.0118***   0.0112** 
 (2.54)  (2.40)  (2.68)  (2.55) 
B/M -0.0031  -0.0037  -0.0026  -0.0030 
 (-0.75)  (-0.88)  (-0.62)  (-0.72) 
Log (total assets) -0.0026***  -0.0025***  -0.0027***  -0.0027*** 
 (-3.27)  (-3.16)  (-3.33)  (-3.23) 
Tobin's Q -0.0004  -0.0005  -0.0008  -0.0008 
 (-0.54)  (-0.61)  (-1.04)  (-1.02) 
ROA 0.0128  0.0128  0.0156  0.0157 
 (0.95)  (0.98)  (1.24)  (1.27) 
Sales Growth 0.0020  0.0021  0.0018  0.0020 
 (1.27)  (1.38)  (1.18)  (1.30) 
Leverage 0.0162***  0.0159***  0.0164***  0.0162*** 
 (2.66)  (2.63)  (2.63)  (2.60) 
Price Run-Up -0.0080**   -0.0080**   -0.0070**   -0.0072** 
  (-2.39)   (-2.29)   (-2.05)   (-2.06) 
Public Target -0.0092***  -0.0092***  -0.0093***  -0.0093*** 
 (-4.07)  (-4.00)  (-4.23)  (-4.13) 
Domestic Target -0.0005  -0.0005  -0.0012  -0.0012 
 (-0.18)  (-0.18)  (-0.46)  (-0.47) 
Relative Deal Size 0.0109*  0.0109*  0.0124**  0.0123** 
 (1.95)  (1.89)  (2.25)  (2.19) 
Toehold -0.0060*  -0.0062*  -0.0063*  -0.0065* 
 (-1.81)  (-1.79)  (-1.82)  (-1.82) 
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Competing Offer -0.0167**  -0.0172**  -0.0179**  -0.0182** 
 (-2.12)  (-2.16)  (-2.20)  (-2.23) 
Stock Deal -0.0077  -0.0082  -0.0064  -0.0069 
 (-1.46)  (-1.55)  (-1.20)  (-1.29) 
Cash Deal 0.0038*  0.0037*  0.0041**  0.0040** 
 (1.88)  (1.81)  (2.04)  (1.97) 
Diversifying 
Acquisition 
-0.0050***  -0.0049***  -0.0045***  -0.0045*** 
 (-3.77)  (-3.59)  (-3.32)  (-3.17) 
Tender Offer 0.0091**  0.0092**  0.0093**  0.0093** 
 (2.13)  (2.11)  (2.19)  (2.16) 
Hostile -0.0233  -0.0215  -0.0214  -0.0196 
 (-1.19)  (-1.14)  (-1.06)  (-1.00) 
Year FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Clustered Std. Err. Firm & Year  Firm & Year  Firm & Year  Firm & Year 
# Observations 7,981  7,981  7,981  7,981 
Adj. R-Squared 0.020   0.019   0.018   0.018 
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Table 5 
Former Analyst CEO/CFO Earnings Guidance Accuracy and M&A Performance: 
Cross-Sectional Evidence on Past Performance 
This table compares the earnings guidance accuracy and M&A performance of former analyst executives to that of other executives. The 
novel feature is that it uses the IBES database to compile performance records for former analyst executives. Better (Worse) Forecaster is equal 
to one if the CEO/CFO in that fiscal period is a former analyst and had better forecasting performance, where better connotes past relative 
forecast accuracy higher (lower) than the median of IBES analysts in our sample and zero otherwise. Better (Worse) Recommender is equal to one 
if the CEO/CFO in that fiscal period is a former analyst and had better recommendation performance, where better connotes past relative 
recommendation profitability higher (lower) than the median of IBES analysts in our sample and zero otherwise. Relative accuracy benchmarks 
management’s forecast error to that of the trailing analyst consensus for the same firm-year. Three-Factor CAR (BHAR) represents the five-
day cumulative (buy-and-hold) abnormal returns centered on the acquisition announcement date using the Fama and French (1993) three-
factor model. Four-Factor CAR (BHAR) represents the five-day cumulative (buy-and-hold) abnormal returns centered on the acquisition 
announcement date using the Carhart (1997) four-factor model.  t-statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors which are two-way 
clustered at firm and year level. Detailed definitions of remaining variables are in Appendix B.  
  
Dependent Variables 
Relative Accuracy 
 Measures of M&A Performance 
 Three-Factor  
CAR (-2, +2) 
  
Three-Factor  
BHAR (-2, +2) 
  
Four-Factor  
CAR (-2, +2) 
  
Four-Factor  
BHAR (-2, +2) 
Better Forecaster 0.5146**         
 (2.43)         
Worse Forecaster 0.3229         
 (1.61)         
Better Recommender   0.0077**   0.0072**   0.0116***   0.0110*** 
      (2.49)   (2.36)   (6.28)   (8.24) 
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Worse Recommender     0.0062   0.0057   0.0031   0.0025 
   (0.46)  (0.43)  (0.23)  (0.19) 
Control Variables Included  Included  Included  Included  Included 
Year Fixed Effect Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Clustered Std. Err. Firm & Year  Firm & Year  Firm & Year  Firm & Year  Firm & Year 
# of Observations 13,692  8,328  8,328  8,328  8,328 
Adj. R-Squared 0.008   0.020   0.020   0.018   0.018 
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Table 6 
Former Analyst CEO/CFO and Conference Call Interaction 
This table compares former analyst executives’ conference call answers to those of other executives. 
Managerial Answer Certainty is the percentage of  words in CEO/CFO answers to analyst questions 
during a conference call that convey uncertainty multiplied by -100, where uncertain words are from 
Loughran and McDonald (2011). Forward-Looking Questions is the proportion of analyst questions 
containing forward-looking terms during the conference call, where forward-looking terms are from 
Li (2010). Quintile Rank is a rank variable coded zero through four, with four representing the top 
forward-looking quintile. Top quintile is an indicator variable coded as one for the top forward-looking 
quintile and zero otherwise. Former analyst equals one if the firm's CEO/CFO in that fiscal period has 
equity research analyst working experience and zero otherwise. t-statistics in parentheses are based on 
standard errors which are two-way clustered at firm and year level. Detailed definitions of remaining 
variables are in Appendix B. 
 Dependent Variables: Managerial Answer Certainty 
  
Quintile Rank 
Forward-Looking 
Questions 
Top Quintile 
Forward-Looking 
Questions 
Former Analyst 0.0461** 0.0251 0.0408** 
 (2.36) (1.11) (2.12) 
Forward-Looking Questions  -0.0001 0.0104** 
  (-0.17) (2.39) 
Former Analyst ∙ Forward-Looking 
Questions 
 0.0103** 0.0260* 
  (2.20) (1.80) 
B/M 0.0113 0.0114 0.0111 
 (1.43) (1.44) (1.40) 
Size -0.0051** -0.0051** -0.0053** 
 (-2.28) (-2.30) (-2.39) 
Raw Stock Return 0.0014 0.0014 0.0015 
 (0.40) (0.41) (0.45) 
Return Volatility -0.0098 -0.0095 -0.0126 
 (-0.22) (-0.22) (-0.29) 
Earnings Volatility 0.0521 0.0519 0.0516 
 (1.64) (1.63) (1.63) 
Analyst Dispersion 0.0749*** 0.0749*** 0.0733*** 
 (2.92) (2.93) (2.89) 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered Std. Err. Firm & Year Firm & Year Firm & Year 
# of Observations 48,359 48,359 48,359 
Adj. R-Squared 0.069 0.069 0.070 
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Table 7 
Former Analyst CEO/CFO and Overall Firm Performance 
This table compares overall firm performance of former analyst executives to that of other executives. ROA is net income divided by total 
assets in the fiscal year. Three-Factor CAR (BHAR) represents the five-day cumulative (buy-and-hold) abnormal returns centered on the 
acquisition announcement date using the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model. Four-Factor CAR (BHAR) represents the five-day 
cumulative (buy-and-hold) abnormal returns centered on the acquisition announcement date using the Carhart (1997) four-factor model. 
Former analyst equals one if the firm's CEO/CFO in that fiscal period has equity research analyst working experience and zero otherwise. t-
statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors which are two-way clustered at firm and year level. Detailed definitions of remaining 
variables are in Appendix B.  
  Dependent Variables: Measures of Firm Performance 
 ROA   
Three-Factor 
CAR 
  
Three-Factor 
BHAR 
  
Four-Factor 
CAR 
  
Four-Factor 
BHAR 
Former Analyst 0.0394***   0.0911***   0.0778**   0.0955***   0.0798** 
 (2.63)  (3.18)  (2.40)  (4.19)  (1.97) 
Return Volatility -0.4491***  -0.2135  -2.4647*** 
 -0.3093  -2.4512*** 
 (-5.37)  (-0.42)  (-3.44) 
 (-0.71)  (-3.73) 
B/M -0.0597***  0.4385***  0.6562*** 
 0.4373***  0.6643*** 
 (-6.56)  (6.54)  (6.54) 
 (6.82)  (6.99) 
Size 0.0035  -0.0866***  -0.0935*** 
 -0.0919***  -0.0977*** 
 (0.58)  (-8.93)  (-6.33) 
 (-10.14)  (-6.60) 
Earnings Volatility -0.1722***  -0.1046**  -0.3624* 
 -0.1146***  -0.3340 
 (-3.74)  (-2.33)  (-1.77) 
 (-2.69)  (-1.57) 
HHI -0.0019  0.0664  0.1056 
 0.0625  0.1059 
  (-0.14)   (1.59)   (1.56)   (1.53)   (1.52) 
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R&D -0.0139**   0.0582***   0.0422   0.0647***   0.0530 
 (-2.14)  (3.18)  (1.13) 
 (3.73)  (1.56) 
Analyst Following -0.0007  0.2011***  0.2988*** 
 0.2036***  0.3056*** 
 (-0.07)  (10.06)  (8.86) 
 (10.73)  (9.56) 
Litigate -0.0077 -0.0608  -0.1000 
 -0.0534  -0.0891 
 (-1.10)  (-1.44)  (-1.51) 
 (-1.22)  (-1.24) 
Analyst Dispersion 0.0501* 0.0496  0.1130 
 0.0891  0.1387 
 (1.91)  (0.60)  (1.15) 
 (1.11)  (1.47) 
Age 0.0141***  0.0698***  0.1221*** 
 0.0765***  0.1316*** 
 (3.47)  (4.14)  (3.42) 
 (4.66)  (3.91) 
Year Fixed Effect Yes  Yes  Yes 
 Yes  Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes  Yes  Yes 
 Yes  Yes 
Clustered Std. Err. Firm & Year  Firm & Year  Firm & Year  Firm & Year  Firm & Year 
# of Observations 14,197  14,770  14,770 
 14,770  14,770 
Adj. R-Squared 0.076   0.092   0.096   0.091   0.093 
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Table 8 
CEO/CFO Placebo Tests: 
Pseudo-Former Analysts and Alternative Previous Work Experience 
 
This table re-examines the main CEO/CFO results with pseudo-former analysts and alternative work 
experience variables. Pseudo-Former analyst equals one for firm-years prior to the start date or after the 
end date of the former analyst CEO/CFO’s tenure and equals zero otherwise. General Financial Analyst 
equals one for work experience as a financial analyst, excluding sell-side and buy-side analysts. 
Accounting/Finance Experience equals one for work experience in accounting or finance, excluding sell-
side and buy-side analysts. Engineering Experience equals one for work experience in engineering. t-
statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors which are two-way clustered at firm and year 
level. Detailed definitions of remaining variables are in Appendix B. 
  Coefficients on Previous Working Experience 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variables 
Pseudo-
Former 
Analysts 
General 
Financial 
Analysts 
Accounting/ 
Finance  
Engineering 
Guidance Accuracy:     
Relative Accuracy 0.0857 -0.2154 0.0041 -0.0859 
 (1.47) (-0.99) (0.12) (-1.11) 
# of Observations 13234 16,176 16,176 16,176 
     
M&A Performance:     
Three-Factor CAR (-2, +2) -0.0022 -0.0038 -0.0002 -0.0022 
 (-0.64) (-0.90) (-0.15) (-0.70) 
# of Observations 8,034 10,038 10,038 10,038 
     
Three-Factor BHAR (-2, +2) -0.0022 -0.0037 -0.0003 -0.0024 
 (-0.65) (-0.90) (-0.18) (-0.77) 
# of Observations 8,034 10,038 10,038 10,038 
     
Four-Factor CAR (-2, +2) -0.0019 -0.0039 0.0001 -0.0018 
 (-0.55) (-0.88) (0.09) (-0.56) 
# of Observations 8,034 10,038 10,038 10,038 
     
Four-Factor BHAR (-2, +2) -0.0019 -0.0038 0.0000 -0.0020 
 (-0.55) (-0.89) (0.02) (-0.61) 
# of Observations 8,034 10,038 10,038 10,038 
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Managerial Answer Certainty 0.0130 -0.0127 -0.0042 0.0124 
 (0.99) (-0.69) (-0.91) (1.29) 
# of Observations 51,449 60,861 60,861 60,861 
     
Firm Performance:     
ROA 0.0115 0.0058 0.0067** 0.0058 
 (1.14) (1.14) (2.11) (0.85) 
# of Observations 14,243 17,429 17,429 17,429 
 
    
Three-Factor CAR 0.0464 -0.0084 0.0295*** -0.0140 
 (1.30) (-0.30) (3.11) (-1.23) 
# of Observations 14,810 18,075 18,075 18,075 
     
Three-Factor BHAR 0.0671 0.0210 0.0435*** -0.0132 
 (1.10) (0.61) (2.70) (-0.42) 
# of Observations 14,810 18,075 18,075 18,075 
     
Four-Factor CAR 0.0516 0.0005 0.0220** -0.0090 
 (1.42) (0.02) (2.07) (-0.99) 
# of Observations 14,810 18,075 18,075 18,075 
     
Four-Factor BHAR 0.0737 0.0368 0.0361** -0.0099 
 (1.13) (1.04) (2.07) (-0.38) 
# of Observations 14,810 18,075 18,075 18,075 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered Std. Err. Firm & Year Firm & Year Firm & Year Firm & Year 
 
 
  
 
 
 
